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DEFENDANT COMMUNICATIONS WITH ABSENT
CLASS MEMBERS IN RULE 23(b)(3) CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' provides for the
maintenance of a class action suit when joinder of the class members is
impracticable, questions of law or fact exist that are common to the class,
the claims of the class representative are typical of those of the class, and
the representative party will protect the interests of the class. 2 A federal
district court may authorize the class representative to maintain a lawsuit as
a class action under any one of three categories of class actions provided in
rule 23(b). 3 In a rule 23(b)(3) class action, a plaintiff may prosecute an action
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. Id. 23(a). Rule 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Id. The prerequisites stated in rule 23(a) are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
maintaining a class action. Id. Rule 23(b) provides additional elements that are necessary to
justify the use of the class action procedure. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23 advisory committee note; see
infra note 3 (text of rule 23(b)).
Rule 23 expresses a policy of judicial economy by authorizing district courts to dispose of many
similar claims in a single lawsuit. See C. WRIGHT, CLASs AcTIONS, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1969).
The class mechanism resolves many claims in one action and eliminates repetitious litigation.
Id. The class action device allows a class representative to prosecute a complaint on behalf of
many "absent" class members, thereby providing a forum for relief on claims that individual
plaintiffs otherwise could not or would not litigate. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99
n.ll (1981), citing Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980). The
customary role of the class representative is to vindicate the rights of individuals who otherwise
would not pursue litigation because the cost of such litigation exceeds the potential benefit of
a successful suit. Bernard, 452 U.S. at 99 n.11; see C. WRIGHT, supra, 47 F.R.D. at 170 (class
action provides large groups of individuals who have similar interests with ability to enforce
their rights).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b) provides:
(b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole, or
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on behalf of a class of plaintiffs if the questions of law or fact that are
common to the whole class predominate over any other questions affecting
the individual class members. 4 After a plaintiff institutes an action and
designates it a class action, the district court determines whether and to what
extent to certify the class.5 Following certification under rule 23(b)(3) the
district court directs individual notices to all potential class members advising
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Id. In class action suits maintained under either rule 23(b)(1) or rule 23(b)(2), a judgment by a
district court, whether or not favorable to the class, binds all persons whom the district court
determines are members of the class. Id. 23(c)(3). In a rule 23(b)(3) class action, however, the
federal rules require that the district court notify all potential class members and give such
members an opportunity to exclude themselves from the class membership. Id. 23(c)(2) A final
judgment in an action maintained under rule 23(b)(3) does not bind those persons who have
requested exclusion from the class membership. Id. 23(c)(3); see C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, 47
F.R.D. at 181 (judgment in rule 23(b)(3) action binding only on members who have not excluded
themselves from action).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) provides for a class action when such an
action would save time, effort and expense but would not risk procedural fairness. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note. A district court, in its discretion, may authorize a rule
23(b)(3) class suit when such a suit is "convenient and desirable" and "superior" to any other
procedure in the particular circumstances. Id.; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, 47 F.R.D. at 178
(district court has discretion whether to allow rule 23(b)(3) action); id. (district court must find
proposed class action superior to other methods for fair and efficient adjudication). Actions
maintained under rule 23(b)(3) are the most prevalent form of class actions. See id. at 179.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1),(4). Rule 23(c)(1) and (c)(4) provide:
(c) Determination By Order Whether Class Action To Be Maintained; Notice,
Judgment; Action Conducted Partially As Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits....
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.
Id. District courts have certified actions as class actions for adjudication of limited issues. See
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 372 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (class certified for
determination of compensatory and punitive damages); Hernandez v. M/V Skyward, 61 F.R.D.
558, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (class treatment for issue of negligence); id. (determination of
proximate cause, contract liability and damages must proceed in individual actions). District
courts also have certified actions as class actions for adjudication of claims of subclasses. See
In re General Motors Corp. Engine Inter. Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1116 (7th Cir. 1979) (certification
of subclass composed of plaintiffs who purchased automobiles before specified date).
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them of their rights and obligations in the class suit and of their right to
exclude themselves from the class membership within a specified period.
6
The district court has the responsibility to direct to the potential class
members the "best notice practicable" and to safeguard them from unau-
thorized and misleading communications by the named parties or the named
parties' attorneys.
7
Defendants and their counsel, however, frequently attempt ex parte
communications with absent class members in an effort to dissuade such
members from participating in the class suit.8 Such abusive communications
6. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) provides:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the
class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
Id.; see Erhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980) (class notice is
crucial to proper functioning of rule 23(b)(3) class suit). Class notice provides an impartial
statement of the nature of the lawsuit and informs potential class members of their rights,
including the right to "opt-out" if the class members' interests conflict with those of other
class members. Id. at 846. Additionally, class notice informs potential class members of their
alternative right to proceed by individual action. Id.
A final judgment in a rule 23(b)(3) class suit binds all class members who do not opt-
out. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Potential class members, therefore, must have an unfettered
opportunity to decide whether to request exclusion from the class. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l
Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (prospective class members must receive
unbiased information about merits of action to decide whether to participate in class litigation);
Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (class members
must base their decision to participate in or withdraw from class action litigation on independent
judgment of their own best interests).
7. Erhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980) (impartial class
notice is crucial to entire scheme of rule 23(b)(3)); id. (district court has responsibility to direct
best notice practicable and protect against unauthorized and misleading communications).
Unapproved communications with class members that are incomplete, biased or false adversely
affect the administration of justice. Id. The district court, therefore, should limit, within
constitutional constraints, contacts by the parties and their attorneys with the class members.
Id.; see Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981)
(district court and attorneys have responsibility to insure class members' free and unfettered
decision of whether to remain in class membership); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITmGATION
§ 1.41, at 47 n.33 (1978) (district courts should exercise their power liberally to prevent abuse
of class device by unapproved pre-trial communications) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
8. See MANUAL, supra note 7, § 1.41, at 48-49 (types of potentially abusive communi-
cations are so numerous and unpredictable as to defy "exhaustive definition"); I J. MooRE &
I. CURIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.41, at 32, 33 n.43 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE]. Federal court judges have reported repeated instances of defend-
ants' improper and unethical communications with class members that were either difficult or
impossible to detect in time to prevent harm to the class members. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra, § 1.41, at 32, 33 n.43. Such improper communications with class members have included
misrepresentations concerning the status, purposes or effects of the class suit and communica-
tions that contradicted the court-directed class notice. See Kronenberg Hotel Governor Clinton,
1985]
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undermine the effectiveness of the court directed class notice, 9 undermine
the ability of legally unsopbisticated class members to make an independent
decision whether to exclude themselves from the class membership'0 and, in
cases of threats of economic, legal or physical sanctions against the class
members, create an environment in which the defendant coerces the class
members to forfeit their rights against the defendant." Additionally, a
defendant's unauthorized ex parte communications with individual class
members undermine the ability of the class counsel to adequately represent
the interests of each class plaintiff. 2 For example, a defendant, by engaging
in misleading communications with individual class members, may remove
enough members from the potential class membership to cause the district
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Improper communications also have included
soliciting exclusions from the class membership. See Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp.,
62 F.R.D. 65, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Additionally, attempts to secure affidavits denying that the
class member was represented by the class representative or its counsel constitute improper
communications. See Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Amfac, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 487, 491 (D.
Hawaii 1971); Moss v. Lane, 50 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. Va. 1970). Simulating legal process
designed to influence a class member to submit to discovery and furnishing false information
about the consequences of potential actions by class members is also a form of abusive
communications. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra § 1.41, at 32 n.43. Furthermore,
misinforming class members so that a defendant could effect a settlement exclusively with the
named plaintiff or with a small portion of the class constitutes abusive communication. Yaffe
v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
9. See Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981)
(defendant's unauthorized communication with class members included legal advice that district
court specifically omitted from class notice); see also supra note 6 (discussion of importance of
impartial, court-directed class notice).
10. See American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1974) (danger
exists that class action defendants will convince legally unsophisticated class members that claim
is unlikely to succeed); see also infra text accompanying note 83 (discussion of attorneys'
superior legal knowledge and skill).
11. See In re International House of Pancake Franchise Litig., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,797, at 91,371 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (threats by defendant franchisor to terminate franchise
agreements with franchisees who participate in the class action create coercive environment). In
International House, plaintiffs initiated an antitrust action on behalf of all franchisees of the
defendant. Id. In response to the action, agents of the defendant franchisor threatened to
terminate the franchise contracts with any franchisee who participated in the class action or
cooperated with the plaintiff's attempts to prepare for trial. Id. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri entered a preliminary injunction barring the defendants
from terminating such franchise agreements unless the franchisee failed to pay its indebtedness
to the defendant. Id. at 91,372; see Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725, 726
(3d Cir. 1962) (district court has authority to issue preliminary injunction when defendant drug
manufacturer cancelled accounts of plaintiff wholesaler after plaintiff initiated non-class antitrust
action against defendant); 2 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2715(d), at 1181
(1977) (threats of legal, economic or physical sanctions raise serious questions of legal propriety);
id. § 2720(d), at 1189 (threats constitute abuse of class action and court is empowered to impose
sanctions against party who engages in such communications).
12. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussion of disciplinary rules' appli-
cation in class action suits); infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (discussion of attorney-
client relationship between class counsel and potential class members).
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court to deny certification of the action as a class action. 13 As a result of
such misleading communications, individual class members might forfeit
their rights against the defendant without the benefit of the legal advice of
the class counsel. 14 Moreover, by engaging in unauthorized communications
with absent class members a defendant might obtain information that the
rules of discovery otherwise would not permit. 5
Nevertheless, certain types of communications with individual class
members by the defendant or its counsel are necessary to aid the defendant
in preparing for trial, 6 to negotiate good faith, out-of-court settlements 7 or,
in cases in which the parties are involved in an ongoing business relationship,
to engage in communications necessary in the ordinary course of such
business.'" The federal courts, therefore, must balance the courts' duty to
protect class members from abusive communications with the defendant's
need to communicate with individual class members.
Federal district courts have both the duty and the broad authority to
govern the conduct of the named parties and the attorneys in class action
litigation because the class action mechanism presents the potential for
abusive conduct. 19 A district court's authority to limit defendants' ex parte
communications with class members derives from rule 23(d)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the court to control the conduct
of the class action by issuing orders imposing conditions on the representative
13. See Greisler v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455, at 94,039
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (affidavits of noninterest signed by potential class members probative to
determine numerosity at class determination hearing); infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text
(discussion of Greisler and numerosity requirement of rule 23(a)(I)).
14. See Greisler v. Hardee's Food Sys., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455, at 94,039 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (defendant obtained from potential class members affidavits releasing defendant of
all liability); see also infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussion of importance of
legal advice from class attorney to protect interests of class members).
15. See I MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE, supra note 8, 1.41, at 32 n.43 (instance reported
by federal judges of defendant simulating legal process designed to influence class member to
submit to discovery).
16. See Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 377 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (discovery
as proper method of trial preparation); id. (defendant's attempted discovery without involvement
of class counsel constituted unethical behavior); id. (defendant must identify class members
from whom defendant needs to obtain discovery and must demonstrate need for exception from
restrictions on communication).
17. See American Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1974) (neutrally
worded notice of settlement offer including position of both parties sent to individual class
members); infra note 62 (discussion of settlement offers communicated to individual class
members).
18. See Local 734 Bakery Drivers v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 1 (N.D.
I1. 1972) (defendant bank prohibited from communicating with plaintiff trustees except to
extent that bank's duties under trust accounts required communications); infra note 55 (discus-
sion of communications made in the ordinary course of business).
19. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) (district court has duty and broad
authority to control class actions and to enter orders governing conduct of counsel and parties).
Abusive and unauthorized communications with absent class members constitute a threat to
fairness and due process. MANuAL, supra note 7, § 1.41, at 47 n.3. District courts should apply
19851
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parties. 20 Prior to 1981, many federal districts adopted local court rules that
established automatic preventive judicial control of communications by
formal parties with absent class members. 21 Other federal districts adopted
pretrial noncommunication orders that imposed similar restrictions. 22 The
district courts adopted these preventive measures in response to repeated
liberally the powers granted by rule 23 to protect against such unapproved communications. Id.
Moreover, federal district courts have almost unreviewable discretion in regulating communi-
cations with absent class members. Id.
20. FaD. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(3). Rule 23(d)(3) provides that the district court may impose
orders governing the conduct of the representative parties. Id.; see id. 23(e) (district court in
class action must approve all compromises and dismissals of class suit).
21. See 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 11, § 2720(0, at 1198 n.141 (list of federal court
jurisdictions that have adopted local court rules).
22. See 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 11, § 2720(h), at 1205 n.176 (list of federal courts
that have adopted pretrial non-communication orders). The Manual for Complex Litigation has
recommended that the district courts impose the following pretrial noncommunication order in
every class action suit:
1.41 Sample Pretrial Order Preventing Potential Abuse of Class Actions
(To be promptly entered in actual and potential class action orders unless there is a
parallel local rule)
In this action, all parties hereto and their counsel are forbidden to communicate
directly or indirectly, orally or in writing, concerning such action with any potential
or actual class member not a formal party to the action without the consent and
approval of the proposed communication and proposed addressees by order of this
Court. Any such proposed communication shall be presented to this Court in writing
with a designation of or description of all addressees and with a motion and proposed
order for prior approval by this Court of the proposed communication. The com-
munications forbidden by this order include, but are not limited to, (a) solicitation
directly or indirectly of legal representation of potential and actual class members
who are not formal parties to the class action; (b) solicitation of fees and expenses
and agreements to pay fees and expenses from potential and actual class members
who are not formal parties to the class action; (c) solicitation by formal parties to
the class action of requests by class members to opt out in class actions under
subparagraph (b)(3) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; and (d) communications
from counsel or a party that may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes, and
effects of the class action, and of any actual or potential Court orders therein that
may create impressions tending, without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any
counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice. The obligations and prohibitions
of this order are not exclusive. All other ethical, legal, and equitable obligations are
unaffected by this order.
This order does not forbid (I) communications between an attorney and his
client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of a client or a prospective
client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) commu-
nications occurring in the regular course of business or in the performance of the
duties of a public office or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not have
the effect of soliciting representation by counsel, or misrepresenting the status,
purposes or effect of the action and orders therein.
If any party or counsel for a party asserts a constitutional right to communicate
with any member of the class without prior restraint and does so communicate
[Vol. 42:145
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instances of ex parte communications with class members that impaired,
frustrated and adversely affected the administration of justice.
23
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard24
limited the authority of district courts to impose sweeping restrictions on
communications between named plaintiffs and their counsel and prospective
class members.25 In Bernard, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas adopted a blanket noncommunication order without first
determining whether the circumstances of the case required such an order.
26
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court, holding that the district court's orders constituted an
unconstitutional prior restraint under the first amendment to the United
States Constitution. 27 The Supreme Court did not decide the first amendment
pursuant to that asserted right, he shall within five days after such communication
file with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing, or an accurate and
substantially complete summary of the communication if oral.
A hearing at which applications may be presented for relaxation of this order
and proposed communications with actual or potential members of the class is hereby
set for at _ .m.
Dated this day of .19.
Judge
MAiuAL, supra note 7, Appendix § 1.41, at 238-39; see infra notes 24-30 and accompanying
text (validity of noncommunication order addressed by Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard).
23. See I MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, 1.41, at 31 n.43 (local rules or
orders recommended because of repeated instances of improper communications with absent
class members); supra note 8 (examples of defendants' improper exparte communications).
The Manual for Complex Litigation recommended that every district court adopt a local
rule or order forbidding unapproved communications with potential and actual absent class
members. MAuMAL, supra note 7, § 1.41, at 47. The Manual recommended such preventive
local rules and orders because improper communications are either difficult or impossible to
detect in time to prevent harm to the absent class members. I MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 8, 1.41, at 32, n.43. The Manual for Complex Litigation, which was published
under the supervision of distinguished federal judges, is the most widely used source of class
action guidance among judges and lawyers. See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 11, § 3025, at 5-6
& n.10; Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 93 n.4 (1981).
24. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
25. Id. at 99. In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, the plaintiffs filed an action on behalf of all
present and former black employees of the defendant, alleging racial discrimination in the
defendant's employment practices. Id. at 92. A lawyer for the plaintiff class attended a meeting
of 75 employees and recommended that they not sign released of the defendant's liability that
were sent to the employees under a conciliation agreement negotiated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission before the commencement of the present suit. Id. at 92-93. On Gulf
Oil's motion, the district court entered an'order imposing a complete ban on all communications
by all of the parties concerning the litigation with actual or potential class members without the
prior approval of the district court. Id. at 94-95.
26. Id. at 102-03. The district court in Bernard adopted in its noncommunication order
the exact language of Sample Pretrial Order No. 15 in the Manual for Complex Litigation. Id.
at 93, 94; see supra note 22 (text of Sample Pretrial Order No. 15).
27. 619 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1980). A majority of the Fifth Circuit en banc in Bernard
held that the case did not show a particularized need to justify the district court's imposition
1985]
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issues on which the Fifth Circuit based its decision, but determined never-
theless that the policies underlying rule 23 prohibited the district court from
imposing such an order without a particular showing of need. 28 The Bernard
Court held that rule 23 requires the district court to balance the need for
restrictions on communications against the potential interference with the
rights of the parties that such restrictions would create. 29 Significantly, the
Bernard case involved a district court order that restricted communications
between the class representative and potential class members and interfered
with the class representative's duty to protect the interests of all members of
the potential class.3 0 A district court order that would prohibit a defendant
of prior restraint on communications. Id. at 476-78. The majority further held that the district
court's prior restraint was overbroad and was not accompanied by the required procedural
safeguards. Id. at 476-77. A concurring opinion in Bernard refused to reach the first amendment
issue, stating that the district court's order was not based on adequate findings and therefore
was not authorized under rule 23(d). Id. at 478, 481. See generally, Note, Ban on Communi-
cations with Potential and Actual Class Members Voided As Unconstitutional-Bernard v. Gulf
Oil Co., 30 DEPAuL L. REV. 917 (1981) (discussion of first amendment aspects of pretrial
noncommunication order in Bernard).
28. 452 U.S. at 102. The Supreme Court in Bernard did not pass on the requirements
that the first amendment imposed on the district courts. Id. at 103-04. The Bernard Court
stated that it would wait for a case with a fully developed record on abusive communications
in class actions before examining the constitutional issues. Id. at 101 n.15; see Resnick v.
American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Supreme Court in Bernard made
plain that first amendment does not shelter contacts by adversary's lawyer).
29. 452 U.S. at 101. The Bernard Court stated that the district court should limit
communications between the parties and potential class members only on a clear record and
specific findings of particular threatened abuses. Id. at 101, 102. Moreover, the Bernard Court
held that the district court should impose a noncommunication order, consistent with the rights
of the parties to the action, that limits communications as little as possible. Id. at 102.
In Bernard, the plaintiffs attempted to mail a notice to potential class members, encour-
aging them to rely on the class action suit as their remedy for the defendant's discriminatory
employment practices. Id. at 103. The district court found nothing improper or misleading
about the plaintiffs' intended notice, but nevertheless refused to permit the plaintiff to mail the
notice to the class members. Id. The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its
discretion because the Bernard case revealed no grounds upon which the district court could
have determined that such an order was necessary or appropriate. Id.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bernard, the editors of the Manual for
Complex Litigation recommended that the district courts interpret the decision liberally. See I
MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE, supra note 8, 1.41, at 33. The editors further recommended that
the district courts revoke all local rules that prohibit all unauthorized communications and
impose noncommunication orders only after a clear record and specific findings demonstrate
the need for such an order. Id. Cases involving defendant communications with absent class
members arising subsequent to Bernard, however, have not interpreted the Bernard decision as
broadly as recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation. See, e.g., In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 376-77 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (prohibition on defendant communi-
cations under DR 7-104 consistent with Bernard); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D.
372, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Bernard decision does not protect defendants' communications).
30. See 452 U.S. at 101. The Supreme Court in Bernard stated that the Court was
considering the district courts' authority to impose restrictions on communications by plaintiffs
and plaintiffs' counsel to prospective class members. Id. at 91. The district court's order in
Bernard interfered with the class representative's efforts to apprise the employees of the existence
of the class suit and of their choice to reject the defendant's settlement offer. Id. The order
[Vol. 42:145
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from engaging in abusive or coercive communications with potential class
members, therefore, would not conflict with the Supreme Court's decision
in Bernard . 3 In fact, restrictions on a defendant's unauthorized, ex parte
communications with potential class members often will promote the policy
stated in Bernard of avoiding interference with the relationship between the
class representative and the individual class members.3 2
I. DEFENDANT COMMUNICATIONS
A. Communications Before Class Certification .
After the commencement of a class action suit and before the district
court certifies the class, defendants often engage in exparte communications
with potential class members in an effort to obtain affidavits of noninterest
or releases of the defendant's liability.3 3 Some federal courts have found that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit such unauthorized
also impeded the class the representative's ability to obtain information about the merits of the
lawsuit from the employees that the class representative attempted to represent. Id.
31. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 n.21 (1981) (decision limited to specific
situation before the court); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (principles stated in Bernard obviously do not apply to permit communications with class
member by opposing counsel). Restrictions on defendants' contacts with absent class members
do not interfere with any rights of defendants to communicate with class members. See Bernard,
452 U.S. at 102 n.21 (DR 7-104 properly imposes restrictions on some communications); infra
notes 80-84 (discussion of restrictions imposed by disciplinary rules); MANUAL, supra note 7, §
1.41, at 47 n.33 (courts must balance rights of counsel and parties to communicate freely
against absent members' right to fair trial); id. (courts may constitutionally restrict otherwise
protected speech that presents "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice to absent members' right
to fair trial).
32. See Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (prohibition
on defendants' communications consistent with Bernard because such prohibition does not
interfere with class counsel's ability to represent class). The Supreme Court in Bernard stated
that all noncommunication orders must be consistent with the policies embodied in rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bernard, 452 U.S. at 99. The Bernard Court found that
the order in Bernard was not consistent with the policy of rule 23 because the order interfered
with the "formation and prosecution" of the class action by restricting communications to
potential class members by the class representative and class counsel. Id. at 104. A district court
order that prohibits defendants' unauthorized communications promotes the policies of rule 23
by preventing defendants' potentially misleading and coercive communications that interfere
with the formation and prosecution of class actions. See Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95
F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (prohibition on defendants' communications consistent with
Bernard because such prohibition does not interfere with class counsel's ability to represent the
class). Moreover, the Manual for Complex Litigation recommends that, immediately after a
district court imposes the suggested pretrial order, the court should, after a hearing, permit any
proposed communications that would not constitute an abuse of the class action. See MANUAL,
supra note 7, § 1.41, at 50.
33. See, e.g., Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(solicitations of statements of noninterest and releases of liability); Greisler v. Hardee's Food
Sys., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455, at 94,039 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (solicitation of affidavits
releasing defendant of all claims or expressing intention to opt out of class membership); Moss
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communications before class certification.3 4 For example, in Matarazzo v.
Friendly Ice Cream Corp. ,5 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's
precertification solicitations of statements of noninterest and releases of
claims from potential class members were improper communications. 36 In
Matarazzo, a former store manager for the defendant initiated a private
antitrust action against the defendant on behalf of present and former store
managers.3 7 While the plaintiff's motion for class action determination was
pending, the defendant solicited and obtained from the present store man-
agers statements that they would not participate in the class suit and that
they intended to release the defendant from any claims relating to the
plaintiff's antitrust class action suit.38 The Matarazzo court found no evidence
of fraud or coercion in connection with the defendant's solicitation of the
statements and therefore, rejected the plaintiff's claim that such communi-
cations were improper.3 9 The district court in Matarazzo stated that it could
find no basis for a per se rule that would prohibit a defendant's communi-
cations with potential class members at the moment a class representative
plaintiff commences a class suit. 40 In a footnote, however, the Matarazzo
court stated that the "better practice" would be for the defendant to obtain
the district court's prior approval before engaging in precertification com-
munications with potential class members and solicitations of releases of
liability.
41
Although the district court in Matarazzo removed the present store
owners from the potential class membership, the district court nevertheless
v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 124 (W.D. Va. 1970) (solicitation of affidavits denying authority
of class representative to represent class member).
34. See, 'e.g., Nessenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (court permitted
defendant to obtain waivers of interest from potential plaintiffs); Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice
Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (precertification solicitations of noninterest
not improper communications); Greisler v. Hardee's Food Sys., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,455, at 94,039 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (affidavits releasing defendant of claims or expressing intention
to opt-out of class membership).
35. 62 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id. at 66. The plaintiff in Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp. alleged that the
defendant's employment contracts with its store managers constituted illegal tying arrangements,
price fixing and resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 66,
67; see Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
38. 62 F.R.D. 65, 66.
39. Id. at 69.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 69 n.4. The district court in Matarazzo relied on the Manual for Complex
Litigation for its statement that defendants should obtain the district court's prior approval
before engaging in ex parte communications with the class members. Id.; see MA u~A, supra
note 7, § 1.41, at 47 n.33 (district courts should exercise power liberally to prevent unauthorized
communications). The Matarazzo court admitted that the defendant's solicitations in the present
case did not conform to the requirement of the opt out notice in rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 65 F.R.D. at 69 n.4.
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certified the plaintiff's action on behalf of all former store managers.4 2 In
other cases, however, defendants' unauthorized solicitations of affidavits of
noninterest and released of liability have prevented class certification by
depriving the potential class of the numerosity requirement of rule 23(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 43 For example, in Greisler v.
Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,44 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that affidavits signed by poten-
tial class members effectively removed enough members of the potential class
to deprive the action of the requisite numerosity under rule 23(a)(1). 45 In
Greisler, the plaintiff initiated a class suit on behalf of all present and former
franchisees of the defendant corporation, alleging violations of federal
antitrust laws, fraud and breach of contract.46 At the class determination
hearing, the defendant introduced affidavits signed by potential class mem-
bers which either released the defendant of all claims or expressed an
intention to exclude the affiant from the class membership. 47 Relying on the
potential class members' affidavits, the Greisler court held that the plaintiff
could not satisfy the burden of establishing the requirement of numerosity,
and accordingly, dismissed the plaintiff's class suit with prejudice.
4
In contrast to Matarazzo and Greisler, other federal court decisions have
prohibited precertification ex parte communications relating to the litigation
without the district court's prior approval. 49 For example, in Local 734
42. 65 F.R.D. at 70.
43. See, e.g., Nessenoff v. Muten, 67 F.R.D. 500, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) waivers of interest
destroyed numerosity requirement); Greisler v. Hardee's Food Sys., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,455, at 94,039 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (affidavits releasing defendant of claims or expressing intention
to opt out deprived action of class status); Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 207-08
(D.D.C. 1969) (affidavits of noninterest probative at class determination hearing).
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that a plaintiff may maintain a class action only if joinder of all
class members would be impracticable. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); see supra note 2 (text of rule
23(a)(1)). See generally C. WIGHT, supra note 2, 47 F.R.D. 169, 172 (discussion of numerosity
requirement). The federal courts have not imposed a specific number of class members required
to maintain a class action. See Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n,
375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967). District courts should apply the numerosity requirement in
light of the particular circumstances of the case. Id. Some federal courts have determined that
evidence of noninterest of potential class members is not probative on the issue of numerosity
at the class determination hearing. See, e.g., Knoth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395
F.2d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 1968) (district court incorrectly dismissed class suit based on affidavits
of noninterest); J.W.T., Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 139, 142 n.8 (N.D.
II!. 1974) (depositions of class members indicating noninterest in litigation inappropriate at class
determination hearing); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 124 (W.D. Va. 1970) (affidavits.
denying authority of class representative would not defeat class certification).
44. 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455 (E.D. Pa. 1973).




49. See, e.g., Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv.2d 1171, 1172
(W.D. Va. 1976) (court prohibited defendant from engaging in any communications with
potential class members without prior court approval); American Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Harlow, 65
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Bakery Drivers v. Continental Illinois National Bank,50 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois prohibited the defendant
bank from responding to inquiries relating to the class action from the
potential class members." In Continental, two union pension funds initiated
a federal securities claim against the defendant bank on behalf of all persons
for whose trust accounts the bank advised the purchase of certain investment
stock. 2 The defendant bank moved the district court for permission to
respond to inquiries made by persons interested in the trust accounts without
obtaining the district court's prior approval of the language or substance of
such responses.53 The Continental court denied the defendant's motion, citing
rule 22 of the district court's civil rules, which forbade communications
between potential class members and all parties and counsel to the action.1
4
Instead, the district court in Continental directed the parties to submit for
the district court's approval a mutually satisfactory statement that the
defendant would give in response to all subsequent inquiries made by the
bank's customers.
55
F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1974) (court permitted defendant to send neutrally worded settlement
offer with district court's prior approval); Local 734 Bakery Drivers v. Continental Illinois
Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. I11. 1972) (court prohibited defendant from responding to
inquiries of potential class members without prior court approval); cf. Hartford Hosp. v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court approved communication of settlement
offer to absent class members because class attorney involved in negotiations).




54. Id.; see N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 22 (local court rule prohibiting communications with
potential and actual class members).
55. 57 F.R.D. at 2. The Continental court stated that the defendant bank could continue
to communicate on matters concerning the trust accounts to the extent that the bank's fiduciary
duties and obligations under the trust accounts required such communications. Id.
In many class action situations, the defendant and the class members are engaged in a
continuing business relationship that requires frequent communication. See generally 2 H.
NEWBERG, supra note 11, § 2730(d), at 1220 (discussion of communications permitted in
ordinary course of business). Consequently, the federal courts have developed a rule allowing
the defendant to communicate with the class members if such communications are limited to
those necessary in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., High v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 20
Fed. R. Serv.2d 439, 439 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (defendant-employer permitted to distribute employee
personnel questionnaire); Local 734 Bakery Drivers v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D.
1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (communications in ordinary course of business as exception to noncom-
munication order). In High v. Braniff Airways, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas considered whether a defendant employer could distribute to the class
member employees a personnel questionnaire requesting information about each employee. 20
Fed. R. Serv.2d at 439. In High, an employment discrimination class action against the defendant
employer, the plaintiff requested the district court to issue an order preventing the defendant
from obtaining from the class members information that was relevant to the issues in the
litigation. Id. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion because the information requested
in the questionnaire related to the day-to-day relationship and contacts of the defendant with
its employees. Id. Although the High court found that the defendant's distribution of the
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In the absence of a local court rule similar to the one in Continental,
district courts should invoke their authority under rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to prohibit defendants' unauthorized precertifica-
tion communications with potential class members. 6 Such ex parte commu-
nications by defendants constitute a challenge to the district court's ability
to control the class litigation and may undermine the proper functioning of
the class action device. 7 For instance,defendants' ex parte communications
with potential class members defeat the purpose and effectiveness of the
impartial class notice, thus impairing the district court's obligation to direct
the "best notice practicable" and safeguard potential class members from
misleading communications.5 1 Moreover, such communications by defendants
may deprive potential class members of their ability to make an unfettered,
independent decision whether to remain in the class membership. 9 More
importantly, when defendants obtain releases of liability, potential class
members forfeit their legal rights against a defendant without the benefit of
the impartial explanation of the subject matter of the lawsuit provided by
the class notice or of the class counsel's opinion of the merits of the class
suit.60 Consequently, district courts should exercise their authority under rule
questionnaire was in the ordinary course of its business, the court imposed an order prohibiting
the defendant's counsel from reviewing the questionnaires to prevent the defendant's use of
such information in the class litigation. Id.
56. See Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 647, 651 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (district court's authority under rule 23(d) to control class litigation does not depend on
prior class certification), aff'd, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972); 53 F.R.D. at 651 (district court
must control precertification communications to prevent counsel from engaging in race to
complete questionable communications before certification); see also 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note
11, § 2725(a), at 1205-06 (district court has general equity power to enjoin communications
designed to interfere with class members' attempt to obtain judicial redress).
57. See Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. AMFAC, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 487, 491 (D. Hawaii
1971) (unauthorized efforts to obtain affidavits of noninterest violate spirit and letter of rule
23); see also 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 11, § 2720(d), at 1189-90 (solicitation of exclusions
from potential class members constitutes challenge to court's authority to control class litigation).
58. See Erhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980) (court has
responsibility to direct "best notice practicable" and to protect against unauthorized commu-
nications); supra note 7 (discussion of district courts' responsibility to protect absent class
members from unauthorized and misleading communications).
59. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (class
members must receive impartial information about merits of class action in order to decide
whether to remain in class membership); supra note 6 (discussion of important function of
impartial class notice).
60. See Greisler v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455, at 94,039
(potential class members signed affidavits releasing defendant of any claims such member might
have had). In Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l., Inc., the district court avoided the
problem of potential class members' forfeiting their legal rights against the defendant without
the benefit of legal counsel. 55 F.R.D. 50, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir.
1972). In Weight Watchers, the defendant requested an exception to a court order prohibiting
unauthorized communications so that the defendant could negotiate dispositions of the class
action claims with certain franchisees before entering into new franchise agreements. 55 F.R.D.
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23(e) and impose a precertification order in every suit prohibiting unauthor-
ized, ex parte communications between defendants and potential class mem-
bers.61 Thereafter, defendants could communicate with potential class members
only after obtaining the district court's approval and determination that such
communication would not mislead, unduly influence or adversely affect the
interests of potential class members.
6 2
at 51. The district court granted the defendant's request on the condition that all parties and
their counsel would be present at such negotiations. Id. Moreover, the Weight Watchers court
ordered that the class counsel have a full opportunity to express his views concerning the rights
of the class members with respect to the subject matter of the class action. Id.
61. See MANuAl., supra note 7, § 1.41, at 47 (recommendation that district court prohibit
all unauthorized communications).
62. See id. at 50 (district court should freely permit proposed communications that would
not constitute abuse of class action device). The prohibition on communications with absent
class members should not be a permanent or absolute prohibition. Id. The district court should
hold a hearing, upon the request of either party, to determine the propriety of the parties'
proposed communications. Id. Thereafter, the court should grant exceptions to the prohibition
on communications when counsel demonstrates a need to communicate with absent class
members. Id. at 50-51; see supra note 60 (district court in Weight Watchers granted exception
to noncommunication order).
Rather than solicit affidavits of noninterest or releases of liability, defendants frequently
attempt to negotiate out-of-court settlements with individual potential class members. See, e.g.,
Vernon J. RockIer & Co. v. Minneapolis Shareholders, 425 F. Supp. 145, 146-47 (D. Minn.
1977); American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 574 (D. Md. 1974); Hartford Hosp.
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that the parties may not dismiss or compromise a class action suit
without the prior approval of the district court. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e). To the extent that a
defendant's settlement negotiations with individual potential class members do not compromise
the class suit, however, such negotiations do not fall within the scope of rule 23(e). See Rockier,
425 F. Supp. at 149-50 (individual settlements do not violate rule 23(e) because such settlements
do not compromise rights of nonsettling potential class members); id. (individual settlements
permitted even if such settlements deprive action of class status). But see Note, Developments
In the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. Ry. 1318, 1547 (1976) (settlements may prevent
realization of policies of rule 23(e)). Even though individual settlements do not violate the
letter of rule 23, such settlements practically impair the interests of nonsettling plaintiffs. Note,
89 HARv. L. REv. at 1547. In addition defendants' settlements with selected potential class
members may deprive the remaining class members of the resources needed to continue the
litigation. Id.
Although rule 23(e) does not require judicial approval of individual settlements with class
members, district courts retain their authority under rule 23(d) to control sucli settlement
negotiations with potential class members. See supra note 56 (discussion of district courts'
authority under rule 23(d) to control precertification communications). Consequently, district
courts have invoked their authority under rule 23(d) to protect potential class members from
improper communications of settlement offers. See, e.g., American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow,
65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1974) (defendant permitted to communicate neutrally worded
settlement offer to potential class members); id. (notice of settlement offer must include position
of class representative); id. (settlements with potential class members will not affect continuation
of class suit if denial of class certification precludes relief to appreciable segment of class
membership); Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 50, 51 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (defendant permitted to negotiate settlements with potential class members with presence
of plaintiff and involvement of class counsel), aff'd, 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972); Hartford
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B. Communications During Opt-Out Period
After a district court certifies a class action under rule 23(b)(3) and
directs the notices to the class members informing them of the suit, the class
members have a limited period in which to exclude themselves from the class
membership. 63 During this so-called opt out period, the federal courts
unanimously hold that the defendant may not communicate ex parte without
court supervision with the individual class members in an effort to solicit
exclusions from the class. 4 For example, in Kleiner v. First National Bank65
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia prohib-
ited a defendant bank from advising individual class members to opt out of
the class litigation." In Kleiner, two customers of the defendant bank brought
an action against the defendant on behalf of all bank customers who
sustained injuries from the defendant's alleged breach of contract and
violations of the Truth in Lending Act.67 After the district court granted the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification, but before the class members'
deadline for filing exclusion requests, the defendant bank undertook a
systematic campaign of telephone calls to the class members in an effort to
solicit their exclusion from the class membership. 68 Consequently, the plain-
tiffs moved the district court to enjoin the bank from continuing these
communications with the class members. 69 The Kleiner court rejected outright
Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (presence of class counsel
required in settlement negotiations with potential class members).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A); see supra note 6 (discussion of class notice and requests
for exclusion from class membership). At the moment of certification, federal court cases refer
to the absent members as "class members." See, e.g., Erhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc., 629
F.2d 843, 845 (2d Cir. 1980) (absent members are "members of class"); In re General Motors
Corp. Engine Interch. Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1138 (7th Cir. 1979) (absent members are "class
members").
64. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interch. Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1140 n.60 (7th
Cir. 1979) (solicitations to opt out reduce effectiveness of rule 23(b)(3) class actions with no
legitimate reason); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 F.R.D. 77, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (defendant
prohibited from soliciting exclusions from class members during opt out period).
During the opt out period, defendants may communicate settlement offers to individual
class members after obtaining prior approval of the district court. General Motors, 594 F.2d at
1140 n.62. Offers to settle provide redress to the absent class members and reduce the burden
on the courts. Id. at 1140 n.60. Judicial examination of individual settlement offers entails only
considerations of accuracy and completeness of disclosure. Id. at 1140. District courts must
determine, however, that a defendant's settlement offer is not so nominal as to amount to
nothing more than a request for exclusion. See id. at 1140 n.60; supra note 62 (discussion of
settlement offers made before class certification).
65. 99 F.R.D. 77 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
66. Id. at 79.
67. Id. at 77.
68. Id. at 78. In Klelner v. First Nat'l Bank, in addition to contacting class members by
telephone, the defendant's bank officers contacted class members urging them to consider the
customers' past good relationship with the bank when deciding whether to remain in the class
membership. Id.
69. Id. In addition to seeking injunctive relief, the plaintiff in Kleiner sought an order
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the defendant's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Bernard
prohibited the district court form enjoining the defendant's communica-
tions.70 The Kleiner court held that no legal precedent existed permitting a
defendant's ex parte, unsupervised solicitation of exclusion requests and that
such communications were antithetic to the objectives of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require the district court's control
of the class notification process. 7'
Likewise, in Erhardt v. Prudential Group, Inc. ,72 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved the district court's order
permitting class members who previously opted out of the class membership
as a result of the defendant's unauthorized solicitations to "opt back in" to
the class suit. 73 In Erhardt, the plaintiff initiated a class action suit against
the general partner of a development fund on behalf of all past and present
limited partners, alleging breach of contract and violation of fiduciary
duties.74 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York certified the plaintiff's action as a class action and issued a notice to
all class members prescribing the period in which the class members could
exclude themselves from the class membership."5 Prior to the expiration of
the opt-out period, the defendant mailed letters to the class members warning
them of their liability for the costs of the litigation if the defendant prevailed
and urging the members to exclude themselves from the class membership.
76
On plaintiff's motion, the district court ordered the defendant to send a new
class notice allowing all class members who opted out as a result of the
defendant's solicitation to opt back in to the class membership. 77 Addition-
ally, the district court held the defendant in contempt of court and enjoined
the defendant from communicating with the class members without the
court's prior approval. 78 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit approved all of the district court's remedial measures but
vacated the contempt order because the district court failed to include in its
voiding all exclusion requests received from the class members. Id. In a subsequent memorandum
opinion, the Kleiner court granted the plaintiff's request to void all exclusion requests and
further ordered that a new class notice be sent to the class members. See 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d
655, 674-77 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
70. Kleiner, 99 F.R.D. at 79. The district court in Kleiner stated that the Supreme Court's
decision in Bernard did not sanction the Kleiner defendant's communications because such
communications tended to mislead and confuse the class members. Id.; see Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981) (district court should base noncommunication order on clear
record and specific findings that indicate need for such order).
71. Kleiner, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d at 660.
72. 629 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 845-46.
74. Id. at 844.
75. Id.





certification order a restriction on unauthorized communications with the
class members.
79
II. DEFENsE ATTORNEY ComMUNIcATIONS
In addition to exercising their authority under rule 23(b)(3), district
courts may restrict ex parte communications by a defendant's counsel with
potential and actual class members by enforcing Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-
104 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 80 DR 7-104(A)(1)
states that an attorney representing a client may not communicate with
another party who is represented by an attorney on the subject of the
representation without the prior consent of the other party's attorney.81 DR
7-104 operates on the premise that the adversarial legal system functions best
when qualified counsel represent the interests of persons in need of legal
advice.12 DR 7-104 protects lay adverse parties from improper communica-
tions by an attorney who has the advantage of superior legal knowledge and
skill.8 3 Moreover, the rule prevents a lawyer from bypassing the opposing
counsel, thus preserving the proper functioning of the attorney-client rela-
tionship between the adverse party and its counsel .
4
The federal courts consistently have employed the provisions of the
Model Code as sources of procedural and substantive law.85 Significantly,
79. Id. at 846.
80. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE]; see, e.g., Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (DR 7-104 prohibits defendant communications with absent class members); Impervious
Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (Model Code is part of
standard conduct required of attorneys practicing before court); In re Federal Skywalk Cases,
97 F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (DR 7-104 clearly applies in suits that proceed as class
actions).
81. MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104(A)(1). DR 7-104(A)(1) provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation
with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the
prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party as is authorized by law to
do so.
Id.
82. MODEL CODE, supra note 80, EC 7-18 (1969); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 80,
DR 7-104 comment (1969), at 333 (rule facilitates settlement of disputes by placing notice in
hands of those professionally trained to make such judgments). See generally Kurlantzik, The
Prohibition on Communication With an Adverse Party, 51 CONN. B. J. 136 (1977) (in depth
discussion of policies underlying DR 7-104).
83. MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104 comment (1969), at 333.
84. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934); see
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 187 (1938) (attorney may not
communicate with adverse party in absence of counsel about facts of case even if adverse party
is willing to do so); MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104 comment (1969), at 332 (DR 7-104
designated to prevent counsel from impeding attorney's ability to represent client); Kurlantzik,
supra note 82, at 153 (lawyer cannot represent his client adequately if opposing counsel is
speaking ex parte with client).
85. Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see Kleiner
v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 675 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (district court has fundamental
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the federal courts have determined that DR 7-104's prohibition on attorneys'
communications with adverse parties applies with equal force in suits that
proceed as class actions.86 The United States Supreme Court in Bernard
expressed its agreement that the district courts should enforce the prohibition
of DR 7-104 when the Court, citing DR 7-104, stated that the rules of ethics
properly impose restraints on attorneys' communications in class action
suits.8 7 Determination of the exact moment in the course of the litigation
that the absent class members become "parties ... represented by" the class
attorney has been the critical problem in class action cases invoking DR 7-
104.88 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not characterize
the relationship between the class attorney and the absent class members,
nor does it consider specifically the status of the absent members as "parties"
to the action.8 9 As a result, the nature of the relationship and the status of
the class members as "parties" are simply conclusions of the district court
based on the policy considerations of DR 7-104 and the particular purpose
for which the determination becomes relevant.9
The few federal cases that have addressed the issue of when DR 7-104
applies in class suits have found that the disciplinary rule operates as a
restriction on a defendant's counsel's communications with the class members
only after the district court certifies the class. 9' For instance, in Resnick v.
American Dental Association,92 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois determined that class counsel represented un-
named class members at the moment a district court certifies a class.9a In
responsibility to supervise attorneys who practice before it); id. (district court authorized to
raise ethical problems involving attorney misconduct).
86. See, e.g., Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 377 (N.D. I.II 1982)
(reasons for prohibition of DR 7-104 apply with full vigor to class suits); Impd'ious Paint
Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (DR 7-104 applied in class suit);
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (DR 7-104 clearly applies
in suits that proceed as class actions).
87. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 n.21 (1981); see Impervious Paint Indus.
v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (DR 7-104 still applies even though
Supreme Court vacated communication ban in Bernard).
88. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (difficult
to discern precise point at which attorney-client relationship arises between class counsel and
absent class members); Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D.
Ky. 1981) (impossible to state with precision status of relationship between class attorney and
absent class members throughout class litigation). See generally 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 11,
§ 2705, at 1171 (nature of relationship between class counsel and absent class members is
uncertain),
89. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23. See generally 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 11, § 2830, at 1259
(status of absent members as "parties").
90. See 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 11, § 2830, at 1259 (status of class members may
depend on purpose for which status becomes relevant).
91. See Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (DR 7-
104 applies once class is certified); Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1093, 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1977) (DR 7-104 is inapplicable before class certification).
92. 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. I11. 1982).
93. Id. at 376.
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Resnick, the plaintiff brought an employment discrimination suit against the
defendant on behalf of all women who were victims of the defendant's
alleged discriminatory employment practices. 94 After the district court certi-
fied the class, the plaintiff requested a court order barring the defendant
from communicating with the class members without the prior consent of
the class counsel. 9 The plaintiff argued that DR 7-104(A)(1) prohibited such
communications by the defendant and its counsel because the class attorney
currently represented the members of the plaintiff class. 96 The defendant in
Resnick argued against the motion, contending that an attorney-client rela-
tionship did not exist,97 that the Supreme Court's decision in Bernard
proscribed such an order absent a clear showing of abuse,98 and that such
an order unreasonably impaired the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. 99
The Resnick court reasoned that, although DR 7-104(A)(1) is inapplicable
before class certification, a court may invoke the disciplinary rule in a class
suit after certification because the class counsel has a fiduciary obligation to
protect the interests of the class members and possesses all the other indicia
of an attorney representing a client.100 The Resnick court rejected the portion
of the defendant's argument that was based on the Bernard decision, stating
that the Bernard case involved communications not between the defendant
and the class members, but between the class counsel and the class mem-
bers. 01 The communication ban in Bernard interfered with the class counsel's
ability to represent the class members and therefore conflicted with the
purpose of rule 23.102 The Resnick court concluded, therefore, that the
considerations in Bernard do not protect communications by opposing
counsel with class members. 03 Finally, the district court in Resnick stated
94. Id. at 373.
95. Id. at 373-74.
96. Id. at 376.
97. Id. In addition to arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist, the
defendant in Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n argued that the district courts should not
enforce the provisions of the disciplinary rules in litigation. Id. at 378. The district court in
Resnick stated that the courts consistently employ the Model Code as a source of procedural
and substantive law, and therefore rejected defendants second argument. Id. See generally
MODEL CODE, supra note 80 (discussion of application of Model Code in Class action suits).
98. 95 F.R.D. at 376, 378; see Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981); supra
text accompanying notes 24-32 (discussion of Supreme Court's decision in Bernard).
99. 95 F.R.D. at 376.
100. Id. at 376 & n.6. The Resnick court stated that neither the underlying purposes of
DR 7-104 nor judicial precedent supported the defendant's contention that the class members
must initiate the contact with the class counsel to establish an attorney-client relationship. Id.
at 377; see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussion of attorney-client relationship
between class counsel and absent class members). But see Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 20
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1093, 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1977) (class members not represented by
counsel because members did not retain counsel to represent them in matter).
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that the discovery mechanisms provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rather than the defendant's unauthorized, ex parte communica-
tions, constituted the appropriate means by which the defendant could
prepare for trial.04
Similarly, in Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co.,105 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida considered whether DR 7-104(A)(1)
prohibited communications by a defendant with potential class members
before class certification.' °6 In Winfield, employees of the defendant com-
menced a class action suit against the defendant employer alleging violations
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.107 During the pendency of the plaintiff's
motion to certify the class, the parties requested a ruling from the district
court to determine whether the defendant could contact members of the
proposed class to obtain information relating to the litigation. °0 The Winfield
court held that the class members were not parties in the strict sense of the
term and therefore rejected the plaintiff's argument that DR 7-104(A)(1)
should prohibit the defendant's communications.'19 The district court rea-
soned that the class members had not yet retained the class counsel to
represent their interests and thus were not parties represented by counsel
under DR 7-104(A)(1)." 0
The holding in Winfield that potential class members are not "parties"
to the class action suit before class certification in inconsistent with the
federal courts' treatment of potential class members in other circumstances."'
Moreover, the courts that have interpreted the term "a party ... represented
by a lawyer" in nonclass action situations have construed the term broadly
104. Id. at 377. The Resnick court stated that the defendant would violate DR 7-104 by
attempting discovery from the class members without the "involvement" of the class counsel.
Id. The district court stated that, to the limited extent that the defendant must communicate
with the certain class members for trial preparation, the defendant must identify to the court
such class members and demonstrate the reason for excepting them from the restriction. Id.
105. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1093 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
106. Id. at 1094.
107. Id. at 1093; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241,
302-17 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)) (Title VII); Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1982).
108. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1094.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Merc. Exch., 75 F.R.D. 40, 42
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (potential class members are "opposing parties" for purpose of having
counterclaims asserted against them); J.W.T., Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Inc., 63
F.R.D. 139, 142 n.8 (N.D. I11. 1974) (discovery of potential class members permitted). In
National Super Spuds, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
determined that potential class members were "opposing parties" for the purpose of having
counterclaims asserted against them under rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 75
F.R.D. at 42. In National Super Spuds, holders of Maine potato futures contracts initiated a
class action against the defendant, alleging violations of the Commodities Exchange Act. Id. at
41. Before the district court certified the action, the defendant filed counterclaims against
certain unnamed and some unidentified class members alleging a conspiracy to force large scale
[Vol. 42:145
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
for the purpose of applying DR 7-104(A)(1)." 2 For example, in Abeles v.
State Bar,"M the California Supreme Court held that a party who had counsel
of record was a party represented by a lawyer for the purpose of DR 7-104
regardless of whether such counsel had the authority to act on behalf of the
party in that matter." 4 In Abeles, an attorney for a defendant obtained from
one of the plaintiffs named in a lawsuit an affidavit stating that the plaintiffs'
counsel did not have authority to file the complaint on behalf of the
plaintiff."' The Abeles court determined that for the purposes of DR 7-104
the plaintiff was represented by counsel and held that the attorney had
breached his ethical duty." 6 The Abeles court reasoned that a narrower
interpretation of DR 7-104 might interfere with the administration of justice
and harm potential attorney-client relationships." 7 Likewise, in a 1970 In-
formal Opinion"' relating to DR 7-104, the Committee on Professional
Ethics ruled that an attorney could not communicate directly with an insured
party even though the insurance company bore the sole risk of liability in
the lawsuit.1"9 The Committee held that the insured remained a party for the
purpose of applying DR 7-104(A)(1) because he was more than a "disinter-
ested bystander."' 20 Similarly, potential class members are not merely "dis-
interested bystanders" in the class litigation, but in fact may have a personal
stake in the outcome of the action.'
2'
Nevertheless, no federal court decision has invoked DR 7-104 to prohibit
communications in class action suits before class certification.' 2 The policy
defaults in potato futures contracts. Id. at 42. The National Super Spuds court interpreted the
term "opposing party," as used in rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to include
potential class members and therefore permitted the defendant to assert counterclaims against
them. Id. But see Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 24 Fed. R. Serv.2d 357, 358 (W.D. Tenn.
1977) (absent members are not parties for purpose of discovery).
112. MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104 comment (1969), at 335.
113. 9 Cal.3d 603, 108 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1973).
114. Id. at 609 & n.7, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 363 & n.7.
115. Id. at 607, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
116. Id. at 609-10, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
117. Id., 108 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
118. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1149 (1970).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. In a class action under rule 23(b)(3), the actual scope of the class is uncertain
until the expiration of the exclusion period. See supra note 3 (discussion of rule 23(b)(3)).
Unless an individual affirmatively excludes himself from the class membership, he will be bound
by a final judgment in the class suit. See supra note 6 (final judgment binds all members who
do not opt out of class action). During the entire course of the class litigation, therefore,
potential class members ultimately may have a personal interest in the outcome of the class
action. See id.
122. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (class
counsel does not fully represent potential class members before class certification); Resnick v.
American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 n.6 (N.D. Il. 1982) (DR 7-104 does not apply
before class certification); Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
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of DR 7-104,' 23 the disciplinary rule's application in nonclass action con-
texts, 24 and the relationship that actually exists between the class attorney
and the absent class members, 125 however, support the conclusion that federal
courts should extend the application of DR 7-104 to the moment of com-
mencement of the class action. From the beginning of a class action the class
attorney has a duty to protect the interests of the whole class, thereby
establishing a constructive attorney-client relationship with the class mem-
bers. 126 Moreover, the moment of class certification is an arbitrary distinction
for determining when potential class members need DR 7-104's protection
from improper communications by an adverse attorney possessing the ad-
vantage of superior legal knowledge and skill. 27 The potential for defendants'
abusive communications to unduly influence legally unsophisticated individ-
uals into forfeiting their rights and to interfere with the class attorney's
ability to protect the interests of the whole class exists both before and after
a district court certifies the class. 28
Every district court decision passing on the applicability of DR 7-104 in
class action suits has addressed only subsection (A)(1) of that rule, which
1093, 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1977) (DR 7-104(A)(1) does not prohibit communications between
defendant's counsel and class members before class certification). Many federal court decisions,
however, have required the presence of the class counsel in settlement negotiations with potential
class members without expressly invoking DR 7-104. See, e.g., Weight Watchers v. Weight
Watchers Int'l, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 50, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (class counsel must be present at
precertification settlement negotiations with individual potential class members), aff'd, 455 F.2d
770 (2d Cir. 1972); Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(same); see supra note 62 (discussion of precertification settlements with individual potential
class members).
123. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussion of underlying principles of
DR 7-104).
124. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussion of underlying principles of
DR 7-104).
125. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text (application of DR 7-104 in nonclass
action litigation).
126. See Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Ky. 1981)
(class counsel clearly has duty to represent interest of absent class members at institution of
lawsuit); see also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.) (courts should treat suit
brought as class action as such until class determination that class action not proper), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). The parties may not dismiss or compromise a class action without
prior court approval once a plaintiff files a class suit. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(e); see supra note 62
(discussion of rule 23(e)). Consequently, rule 23(e) places on the class attorney the responsibility
to protect the interests of the class. See 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 11, § 2705(a), at 1174; id.
at 1172 (class representative enters into fiduciary relationship with class at moment class
representative files complaint).
127. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussion of purpose of DR 7-104 to
protect lay adverse parties from improper communications by adverse counsel).
128. See, e.g., Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(defendant obtained releases of liability from potential class members without benefit of legal
advice from class counsel); Greisler v. Hardee's Food Sys., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,455,
at 94,039 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (defendant obtained releases of liability from potential class members
without legal advice from class counsel); id. (defendant's solicitation of releases of liability
deprived remaining class members of class action remedy).
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governs an attorney's contact with parties represented by a lawyer. 129 DR 7-
104(A)(2), however, expressly prohibits an attorney from giving any advice,
other than advice to seek counsel, to any person who is not represented by
an attorney if that person's interests have a "reasonable possibility" of being
in conflict with those of the attorney's client. 30 The interests of a defendant
in a class action suit have a reasonable possibility of conflicting with the
interests of the potential class members at the moment a class representative
files a complaint on behalf of the potential class members.,'' Accordingly,
DR 7-104(A)(2) governs the conduct of the defendant's attorney at least at
the moment the class representative files a class suit.132 The district courts,
therefore, should have the authority under DR 7-104(A)(2) to restrict a
defendant's abusive communications before class certification even if the
class members are not "represented by" the class attorney.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility applies, of course, only
to defendants' attorneys and not to the defendants themselves.'33 Conse-
quently, defendants in class action suits may attempt to avoid the prohibition
of DR 7-104 by engaging in exparte communications with the class members
without the participation of the defendants' attorneys. 3 4 The federal courts,
129. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(court applied DR 7-104(A)(1)); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D.
I11. 1982) (same); Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Ky.
1981) (same); Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1093, 1094 (N.D.
Fla. 1977) (same).
130. MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104(A)(2). DR 7-104(A)(2) provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(2) give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer other than the advice
to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility
of being in conflict with the interest of his client.
Id. DR 7-104(A)(2) forbids attorney communications with any "person" whose interests are
adverse to those of the attorney's client. Id. The drafters of the Model Code used the term
"person" instead of "party" in order to widen the scope of the disciplinary rule's prohibition.
MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104, comment (1969), at 341-42. Under DR 7-104(A)(2), an
attorney may not advise an unrepresented party concerning a certain course of conduct that the
individual should pursue. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1034 (1968).
131. See supra note 2 (class representative initiates claim on behalf of absent class members).
The interest of a class action defendant conflict with potential class members to the extent that
the class representative has asserted a claim against the defendant on behalf of the potential
class members. See id. Attempts by defendants to obtain from potential class members releases
of liability or to negotiate settlements of the alleged class claim demonstrate that class action
defendants and potential class members have adverse interest. See supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text and note 62 (discussion of attempts by defendants to dispose of individual
claims of potential class members); cf. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op.
1140 (1970) (improper for attorney to solicit from unrepresented party waivers of legal process);
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 58 (1931) (improper for
attorney of husband to secure from unrepresented wife consent agreement for divorce).
132. See supra note 131 (discussion of adverse interests of class defendant and potential
class members).
133. See MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104(A)(1).
134. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
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however, have interpreted the provision in DR 7-104(A)(1) that an attorney
"shall not ... cause another to communicate" ' 5 as placing on the attorney
an affirmative duty to dissuade his client from communicating with an
adverse party. 3 6 For instance, in Impervious Paint Industries v. Ashland
oil, 137 the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
considered whether an attorney for a class action defendant violated DR 7-
104(A)(1) when the attorney failed to advise against the defendant's unau-
thorized communications.' 38 After the district court in Ashland Oil certified
the plaintiff's antitrust suit as a class action, the defendant engaged in
communications with the class members in an effort to persuade them to
opt out of the class membership. 139 The district court in Ashland Oil
acknowledged that the defendant's attorneys themselves did not communicate
with the class members and that the attorneys probably did not advise the
defendant to engage in such communications.140 The Ashland Oil court held,
nevertheless, that the defendant's attorneys violated DR 7-104(A)(1) because
the attorneys, being aware of the defendant's communications, should have
advised against the defendant's course of action.' 4' Consequently, the Ash-
land Oil court restored to the class membership all of the class members
who opted out of the class suit as a result of the defendant's unauthorized
communications. 142
Similarly, in Kleiner v. First National Bank, 43 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia imposed sanctions on the defend-
ant and its counsel for the defendant's unauthorized communications with
absent class members.'44 In Kleiner, the defendant bank engaged in a
Impervious Paint Indus. V. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Ky. 1981); infra text
accompanying notes 137-47 (discussion of attorneys' knowledge of defendants' ex parte com-
munications with absent class members).
135. See MODEL CODE, supra note 80, DR 7-104(A)(1).
136. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(unethical for attorney to sanction defendant-clients' unauthorized communication); Impervious
Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (attorney has affirmative
duty to dissuade defendant from engaging in unauthorized communications).
137. 508 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
138. Id. at 723.
139. Id. at 722. The defendant in Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil sent to potential
class members additional copies of the class notice, reminding them of the need to affirmatively
opt out within the exclusion period. Id. Additionally, the defendant advised the potential class
members that the members might be subjected to discovery and other legal procedures if they
failed to exclude themselves from the class membership. Id. The district court in Ashland Oil
stated that the defendant's contact with the class members was especially disturbing because




142. Id. at 724. The Ashland Oil court, in addition to restoring the class members to the
class, issued an injunction against subsequent communications by the defendants and ordered
the delivery of special notices to the class members whom the defendants contacted. Id.
143. 37 Fed. R. Serv.2d 655 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
144. Id. at 673, 675-77. The Kleiner court ordered the defendant to reimburse plaintiff's
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systematic program of communication with potential class members on the
advice of its counsel that such communications were permissible. 45 Moreover,
the defendant's counsel helped prepare the information that the bank dis-
tributed to other potential class members.' 46 The Kleiner court concluded
that the attorney's conduct was, in effect, an unethical direct communication
with class members made without the required consent of the class counsel. 47
The Kleiner court, in accord with the Ashland Oil decision, preserved the
integrity of DR 7-104(A)(1) and the class action device by placing on the
defendant's attorney a duty to dissuade his client from engaging in unau-
thorized communications with potential class members.
III. CONCLUSION
A final judgment in a rule 23(b)(3) class suit binds all members who do
not exclude themselves from the class membership.' 4 Potential class mem-
bers, therefore, must receive unbiased information about the merits of the
case to make an independent decision whether to participate in the class
litigation. 49 Consequently, federal district courts have the responsibility to
ensure that potential class members receive the "best notice practicable" and
to protect such members from unauthorized and misleading communica-
tions.'50 District courts have both the duty and broad authority to govern
the conduct of class action defendants and their attorneys. 5 1 Although all
federal courts prohibit defendants' ex parte, unauthorized communications
with absent class members after class certification,' 52 many courts have
refused to prohibit such unauthorized communications before class certifi-
cation.'53 Defendants' precertification communications, however, present, to
the same extent as unauthorized post-certification communications, the dan-
ger of undermining the purpose and effectiveness of the impartial class notice
counsel for the expenses incurred in the present litigation, imposed a fine on the defendant's
attorney and disqualified the defendant's attorney from subsequent participation in the case.
Id. at 675-77.
145. Id. at 671.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3).
149. See supra note 6 (discussion of potential class members' need to obtain unbiased
information about merits of class suit).
150. See supra note 7 (discussion of district courts' duty to protect interests of potential
class members).
151. See supra note 19 (discussion of district courts' authority to regulate communications
with absent class members).
152. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussion of rationale for prohibiting
defendants' post certification communications with absent class members).
153. See supra note 34 (list of federal courts that allow defendants' precertification
communications with absent class members).
19851
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
and impair the district courts' ability to safeguard potential class members
from misleading and coercive communications. 54 Defendants' precertifica-
tion communications may deprive potential class members of their ability to
make a knowedgeable and independent decision whether to remain in the
class membership.'55 Moreover, such communications may result in potential
class members forfeiting their legal rights against the defendant without the
benefit of legal counsel or of the impartial explanation of the class suit
provided by the class notice.
5 6
Federal district courts, therefore, should enter a precertification order in
every class action suit prohibiting defendants' and defendants' attorneys'
unauthorized, ex parte communications that attempt to dissuade potential
class members from participating in the class litigation or that would mislead,
unduly influence, or adversely affect the interests of potential class mem-
bers. 5 7 Such a district court order would allow defendants' communications
made in the ordinary course of business' 58 and authorize defendants' trial
preparation through ordinary discovery procedures.5 9 Defendants could dis-
tribute settlement offers to potential class members after the district court's
determination that the communication is neutrally worded' 60 and could
engage in settlement negotiations with potential class members with the
presence of the class counsel.' 6' This type of district court order promotes
the dictate of DR 7-104(A)(2) prohibiting an attorney's communications with
persons whose interests are likely to be adverse to those of the attorney's
client' 62 and the policy of the Supreme Court's decision in Bernard of
preventing interference with the formation and prosecution of class action
suits.' 63
ROBERT C. RICE
154. See supra note 7 (discussion of district courts' responsibility to protect absent class
members form unauthorized and misleading communications).
155. See supra notes 6 & 59 (discussion of potential class members' need to obtain unbiased
information about merits of class suit).
156. See supra note 60 (instances of potential class members' forfeiting legal rights against
defendants).
157. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussion of proposed district court order).
158. See supra note 55 (discussion of communications made in the ordinary course of
business).
159. See supra notes 16 & 104 (discussion of discovery as proper method of trial prepara-
tion).
160. See supra note 62 (instances of district courts invoking their authority to ensure
unbiased settlement offers).
161. See supra note 62 (instances of district courts invoking their authority to ensure
unbiased settlement offers).
162. See supra notes 130-31 and accompany text (discussion of DR 7-104(A)(2) in class
action suits).
163. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme Court's decision in
Bernard).
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